One of the most enduring, yet least questioned, assumptions of modern physics is the belief that physical constants are the foundation of reality, and that Planck units are merely a convenient mathematical construct constructed from these constants. We are accustomed to thinking that the speed of light, the Planck constant, and the gravitational constant are primordial properties of the world, while the Planck length and Planck time are merely their derivatives—the points at which known theories cease to apply.

In Māyā theory, this assumption is reversed, not because it is mathematically incorrect, but because it reverses the order of causes and effects.

Why the history of physics led to a flawed hierarchy

The history of physics demonstrates why such a reversal didn't occur earlier. Science developed from readily observable phenomena toward increasingly deeper levels of description. First, we noticed regularities in motion, energy, and radiation. Only later did we identify the numbers that organized these observations and allowed them to be expressed in equations. Physical constants, therefore, emerged first not because they are more fundamental, but because they were cognitively accessible at an earlier stage of development.

The speed of light was discovered as the empirical limit to the propagation of interactions. Planck's constant emerged as a parameter for quantizing energy. The gravitational constant emerged as a number describing the force of attraction between masses. All of these were introduced into the theory as inputs. The equations worked because they contained the appropriate numbers, not because these numbers were explained.

Planck and natural units – a discovery without interpretation

At the end of the 19th century, Max Planck, while searching for universal units of measurement, noticed that among the physical constants known at that time, three stood out for their special nature: the speed of light in a vacuum $c$, reduced Planck constant

$\hbar$, and the gravitational constant $G$. Each came from a different area of ​​physics—electromagnetism, quantum mechanics, and gravity—yet they could be combined in a way completely independent of arbitrary human conventions.

From these three quantities, Planck constructed natural units of length, time, and mass using only dimensional analysis.

The Planck length appeared as

$\ell_P = \sqrt{\frac{\hbar G}{c^3}}$

Planck time as

$t_P = \sqrt{\frac{\hbar G}{c^5}}$

and the Planck mass as

$m_P = \sqrt{\frac{\hbar c}{G}}$

​​It is worth emphasizing that there is no physics in the sense of mechanism in this derivation. There are only dimensions, proportions, and algebraic necessity. Planck units were not discovered as elements of reality, but as the only possible combinations of known constants that lead to quantities with meaningful dimensions of length, time, and mass.

For Planck, this was a metrological device. These units had formal and philosophical significance—they were meant to be universal, independent of human scales—but they were not interpreted as real "building blocks" of the world. On the contrary, they quickly came to be regarded as a signal that at these scales, known theories ceased to function. The Planck length became synonymous with the boundary of space, the Planck time with the boundary of time, and the Planck mass with the boundary of energy, above which physics loses meaning.

At this point, a profound, if tacit, assumption took shape: since Planck units are composed of physical constants, the constants must be more fundamental than they are. Planck units were considered derived mathematical constructs, and physical constants were primordial properties of reality.

Changing the Direction of Explanation in Māyā Theory

In Māyā theory, this reasoning is challenged at its very source. The same formulas that Planck considered formal begin to be read in reverse—not as definitions of boundaries, but as relationships between the elementary parameters of reality's architecture. They are treated not as algebraic curiosities, but as traces of a deeper level of organization that for over a century remained invisible due to the lack of an appropriate conceptual language.

In this view, Planck units are not composed of physical constants in the ontological sense. Instead, physical constants are the relations between these units, viewed from the perspective of a macroscopic, continuous description of the world.

Planck units in the Māyā model play the role of basic parameters of the discrete, information architecture of reality:

• Planck length ${\mathrm{\ell }}_P$ is the minimum spatial resolution – the smallest distance over which information can be locally updated.
• Planck time $t_P$ is the basic clock tick – the minimum time step of one synchronization operation.
• Planck Mass $m_P$ is the limit of information density – the maximum load that a single planxel can handle without stopping its rhythm.

• Planck Energy is an energy limit — the maximum amount of energy that can be locally concentrated in a single planxel before the region immediately collapses into a micro-black hole, understood here as a local suspension of the processing process.

If we treat Planck's formulas not as definitions of limits but as structural relations, a completely different interpretation of their meaning emerges. The same equations, interpreted for over a century in only one direction, can be reversed—not algebraically, but causally.

Speed ​​of light $c$, considered to be a fundamental property of space-time, then takes the form:

$c = \frac{\ell_P}{t_P}$

​​It is no longer a mysterious maximum propagation velocity, but a simple quotient of the elementary spatial resolution and the elementary time step. In the computational architecture of reality, this represents the maximum rate of synchronization between adjacent planxels — a limit resulting from the fact that information cannot be updated faster than one beat of the basic rhythm.

Similarly, the reduced Planck constant:

$\hbar = E_P \cdot t_P$

​It ceases to be an abstract "seed of quantumness." Its meaning becomes operational: it is an elementary portion of action, i.e., the maximum amount of information (energy) that can be processed by a single planxel in a single cycle. Quantumness, therefore, stems not from a postulate, but from the limitations of local processing.

The most significant change concerns the gravitational constant $G$, which remains one of the least understood numbers in classical physics. When we rewrite it in the language of Planck units, we get:

$G = \frac{\hbar c}{m_P^2} = \frac{E_P \cdot \ell_P}{m_P^2}$

​​Gravity ceases to be a fundamental force here, but becomes a parameter describing the system's response to information overload. The Planck mass determines the maximum information density that a single planxel can handle without interrupting its rhythm. The gravitational constant thus encodes the relationship between energy, space, and the limit of local processing, rather than the interaction between masses in the classical sense.

Boltzmann constant $k_B$ is treated in classical physics as a bridge between temperature and energy. In the standard approach, temperature is a primary quantity, and $k_B$​ is only the conversion rate.

In the Māyā paradigm, this is also reversed. The Planck energy and Planck temperature are related by the relation:

$E_P = k_B \cdot T_P$

​From here directly:

$k_B = \frac{E_P}{T_P}$

​This expression is not a conventional definition. It means that the Boltzmann constant is a parameter of the information architecture that determines how much information energy corresponds to one degree of statistical freedom of the planxel.

Temperature is therefore not a primitive entity. It is a measure of the average information load of planxels. The Boltzmann constant encodes the relationship between processing energy and the number of available microstates. Entropy becomes a statistic of the code configuration, not a property of "matter."

The same applies to the remaining constants: each of them can be expressed as a relation between Planck units, and thus as an architectural parameter, rather than as a primordial property of matter. The historical sequence of discoveries was cognitively natural, but ontologically confusing. First, we observed the effects of code on large scales and described them numerically. Only later did we discover the resolution parameters from which these numbers must derive.

The inversion of formulas is therefore not an empty mathematical operation. If it were, it would carry no interpretive content. In Māyā's view, each physical constant ceases to be an external data and begins to function as an interface between the macroscopic description of the world and its elementary, discrete computational architecture. The constants are no longer mysterious numbers written into equations—they are shadows of Planck's structure seen from the perspective of a continuous description.

In this sense, Max Planck, without yet having a language of information or a concept of computational architecture, discovered something far more profound than he himself could have imagined. He did not establish the limits of knowledge, but rather accidentally revealed the parameters of the system from which all such knowledge emerges.

The proposed reinterpretation is not a tautology, because it does not consist in a simple reversal of algebraic definitions, but in giving the same relations an explanatory role: physical constants are treated here as resultant quantities, determined by more primitive parameters of the computational architecture.

Historical Precedents: When the Derivative Became Fundamental

The history of physics shows that theoretical revolutions rarely involve the discovery of new phenomena alone. Much more often, they involve a radical shift in the hierarchy of concepts, that is, a shift in what is considered fundamental and what is derived. Quantities previously treated as primary then turn out to be effects of a deeper structure, while elements previously considered auxiliary or formal gain the status of fundamental components of the description.

The approach proposed here, in which Planck units $(\ell_P, t_P)$ play the role of fundamental "hardware" parameters of the architecture of reality rather than secondary combinations of physical constants, fits into a well-established tradition of such ontological reversals. Four classic precedents for this type of reversal are presented below.

1. The Copernican Revolution (16th century)

Prior ontology:
The Earth is the stationary center of the Universe, and the complex, epicyclical motions of the planets are their fundamental property.

Ontology after the revolution:
The Sun occupies a central position, and the planetary motions have a simple orbital structure. The complexity of the observed trajectories turns out to be the result of the motion of the observer located on Earth.

Analogy:
Just as the center of explanation was shifted from the Earth to the Sun, in the Māyā theory the center of explanation shifts from continuous constants $(G,\mathrm{\hslash },c)$$<span\; style="font-family:\; Georgia,\; \text{'}Times\; New\; Roman\text{'},\; \text{'}Bitstream\; Charter\text{'},\; Times,\; serif">on\; the\; discrete\; structure\; of\; the\; Planck\; lattice.</span>$ $<span\; style="font-family:\; Georgia,\; \text{'}Times\; New\; Roman\text{'},\; \text{'}Bitstream\; Charter\text{'},\; Times,\; serif"></span>$

2. From caloric to atoms (19th century)

Earlier ontology:
Heat is treated as a substance ("caloric"), and its quantity is a primary physical quantity.

Ontology after the revolution (kinetic theory):
Heat turns out to be a statistical effect of the motion of atoms. Temperature and pressure are not primitive entities, but emergent quantities.

Analogy:
Just as temperature ceased to be a fundamental property of matter and became a result of microdynamics, so the gravitational constant $G$ in the proposed model it ceases to be a fundamental data and becomes a result parameter of the network dynamics.

3. From Aether to Space-Time (1905)

Earlier ontology (Lorentz):
There is an absolute aether with respect to which the speed of light is defined, and relativistic effects are the result of motion through this medium.

Ontology after the revolution (Einstein):
The aether is abandoned and the speed of light becomes a property of the spacetime structure. Lorentz transformations describe geometry, not dynamics with respect to a hidden medium.

Analogy:
Similarly, the Māyā theory eliminates the need to treat $c$ i $\hbar$ as primary "features of the world", deriving them from the elementary parameters of the computational architecture:

$c = \ell_P / t_P$

4. From Continuous Fluid to Electrons (19th/20th Century)

Earlier ontology:
Electric current is described as a flow of continuous fluid or ether.

Ontology after the revolution:
The current turns out to be an ordered movement of discrete particles with a fundamental elementary charge.

Analogy:
Just like elementary charge $e$ became a fundamental property of particles, not of fluids, so the Planck length $\ell_P$​ in the discussed approach it plays the role of a fundamental feature of the elementary "building blocks" of reality.

Conclusion

Each of these breakthroughs had a common feature: what was considered primordial turned out to be emergent, and what had previously been auxiliary or formal gained structurally fundamental status. The shift proposed here—from the constants $G, \hbar, c$ to Planck units as parameters of the computational architecture—constitutes precisely the same type of step.

This is neither a tautology nor an aesthetic device at the level of equations, but a shift in the hierarchy of explanation. Physical constants are not rejected or redefined here, but understood as effective parameters of continuous description, emerging from a discrete, fundamental structure. In this sense, the proposed approach does not break with the tradition of physics but consistently continues it.

What Māyā Theory Does First

In the history of physics, there have been repeated intuitions that information, discreteness, or computability might play a more fundamental role than matter. However, these were interpretive or formal suggestions, not leading to a complete reversal of the explanatory hierarchy. Information appeared as a description, discreteness as a property of models, and Planck units as limits of validity of known theories.

The Māyā theory treats this reversal consistently and mechanically for the first time.

First, it does not posit information as an abstract principle or metaphor. It treats it as the operational substance of reality — something that must be locally processed, synchronized, and constrained. Information does not "describe" the world but realizes it.

Second, Planck units, in this approach, do not function as boundaries of cognition or artifacts of dimensional analysis. They are interpreted as hardware parameters of the architecture of reality: minimum spatial resolution, elementary time step, and local load limit. They are equivalent to clock speed, register size, and bandwidth in computational systems.

Third, physical constants are not treated as inputs to the theory. They become output quantities — relations between Planckian parameters viewed from the perspective of a continuous, macroscopic description. The speed of light, Planck's constant, or the gravitational constant do not define architecture; they are its effects and interfaces.

Most importantly, however, this reversal involves not a formal rewriting of familiar formulas, but a shift in the direction of explanation. The same mathematical relations that for over a century were interpreted as definitions of limits are now interpreted as traces of the mechanism generating the laws of physics. Constants cease to be mysterious numbers embedded in equations, but begin to function as parameters of the system's operation.

In this sense, Maya's theory is neither another interpretation of existing theories nor a philosophical commentary on physics. It is the first attempt to coherently treat Planck units as ontologically primitive, and the first in which computational architecture is not a metaphor but a necessity stemming from the very structure of known physical laws.

Originality clause

The Māyā theory does not claim primacy in the general statement about the informational nature of reality. Its originality lies solely in the adopted direction of explanation: Planck units are treated as ontologically primordial parameters of the architecture of reality, and physical constants as resulting quantities. In this sense, the proposed approach does not constitute a reinterpretation of existing theories, but rather a shift in the starting point of the description.